Article IV - v0.3.0 Draft EOS.IO Constitution - Voter Independence

thomasbcoxthomasbcox Posts: 145 Sr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

Purpose

As previously discussed in the Design Principles of this Draft, the EOSIO Software will provide a mechanism for Token Holders electing Block Producers. Voting will be by weight of staked tokens as detailed elsewhere.

Text of Article

No Member shall offer nor accept anything of value in exchange for a vote of any type, including for Block Producer candidates, Amendments or Worker Proposals, nor shall any Member unduly influence the vote of another.

Discussion

Votes represent a public good. When a token holder takes the time to become informed and cast a wise vote, the whole chain benefits from this effort.

This topic has been discussed extensively, for example here and here.

References

none yet

History of Changes

03-May-2018: reworded article from old:

  • No Member shall accept anything of value in exchange for a vote of any type, including Block Producer candidates or Worker Proposals. Penalties for violation may include, but are not limited to, fines, account freezing, and reversal of transactions.

to new:

  • No Member shall offer nor accept anything of value in exchange for a vote of any type, including for Block Producer candidates, Amendments or Worker Proposals, nor shall any Member unduly influence the vote of another.

Renamed article from 'No Buying or Selling of Votes' to 'Voter Independence'

If this was helpful, please UPVOTE. If not, please REPLY so I can improve.

Thomas Cox
blockchain governance expert - active in the EOSIO ecosystem
US: +1 503.516.3886

(all opinions are my own)

Comments

  • SunTzuSunTzu Posts: 22 Jr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    As we know from the politics, the ability to interfere with voting is a dark art. Simple vote buying is just the start. Votes can be interfered with, deflected, blocked in any number of ways.

    E.g., if I put up a website with lots of hard core stats on BPs and "cast your vote here" which I redirect to my BP, I have not exchanged nor bribed.

    If I write a virus that slides through idle machines looking for keys and votes them my way, no money has changed hands.

    If I DDOS the primary voting site for one BP while my BP slides in, I've not bought off the voters.

    What I have done is breached the independence of the voters. For that reason I'd say we need to set the principle of independence in voting, and raise a high standard against that. So that whenever we find any evidence that interferes with the independence of any voting, we can pursue it.

    Something like:

    The voting of BPs must be conducted independently.

    And then wait for the evidence.

  • mjhombmjhomb Posts: 12 Jr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    I like independence too since it protects against incumbents voting for each other to retain their status.

  • tkaraivanovtkaraivanov Posts: 22 Jr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    @SunTzu said:

    What I have done is breached the independence of the voters. For that reason I'd say we need to set the principle of independence in voting, and raise a high standard against that. So that whenever we find any evidence that interferes with the independence of any voting, we can pursue it.

    How would this affect vote delegation? My first reaction is that it outlaws it as well, and we probably don't want that.

  • maomao Posts: 23 Jr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    @thomasbcox this is a very very complex and vital article. i ask your permission to let our team work for 2 weeks and give a more comprehensive rules of not allowing the buying and selling the votes.

    -EOSREAL
    A New World of EOS
    MP/VM: +1-949.468.5388

  • thomasbcoxthomasbcox Posts: 145 Sr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    @mao said:
    @thomasbcox this is a very very complex and vital article. i ask your permission to let our team work for 2 weeks and give a more comprehensive rules of not allowing the buying and selling the votes.

    I welcome your team's suggestions. Thank you.

    If this was helpful, please UPVOTE. If not, please REPLY so I can improve.

    Thomas Cox
    blockchain governance expert - active in the EOSIO ecosystem
    US: +1 503.516.3886

    (all opinions are my own)

  • thomasbcoxthomasbcox Posts: 145 Sr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    @mao said:
    @thomasbcox this is a very very complex and vital article. i ask your permission to let our team work for 2 weeks and give a more comprehensive rules of not allowing the buying and selling the votes.

    Are you still working on this?

    If this was helpful, please UPVOTE. If not, please REPLY so I can improve.

    Thomas Cox
    blockchain governance expert - active in the EOSIO ecosystem
    US: +1 503.516.3886

    (all opinions are my own)

  • maomao Posts: 23 Jr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    yes. working on. should have something early next week.

    -EOSREAL
    A New World of EOS
    MP/VM: +1-949.468.5388

  • bluabalenobluabaleno Posts: 16 Brand New

    wouldn't eosDAC violate this article automatically?

    eosDAC holders most likely also hold EOS tokens, and to ensure that their DAC tokens are valuable, they will vote for eosDAC to be a block producer...

  • maomao Posts: 23 Jr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    No Manipulation in Voting

    No interference with the process of the voting, whether by increasing the vote share of the BP candidate, depressing the vote shares of the rival BP candidates, or both.

    No buying/selling votes in any forms.

    Discussion:

    In real-world political election system, there are many ways to manipulate the voting process. Although EOSIO prevents a lot of manipulations through technical solutions, one critical problem is vote buying.

    Vote buying can be in many forms such as monetary/token exchange, goods, services. Sometimes, it can be in more subtle forms such as a business partnership, job offering, certain benefits in kind…

    It is harmful to the whole system for any kind of vote buying because those who buy the votes spend more costs resulting to:
    1. Less financial resource to run the system as BP
    2. Take more out from the system to compensate the costs.

    Unlike in real world, In EOSIO, no one can be imprisoned. As a self-operated organization, the maximum penalty shall be deprived BP position in EOS community.

    First, we suggest to establish a EOS Election Commission (EEC) to monitor, analyze and investigate potential voting manipulations. Rather than kicking into the Arbitration process, voting commission can react to voting related disputes more cost-efficiently.

    We suggest the following fules:
    1. Anyone cannot ask for, receive or obtain, give or confer, any property or benefit with the intention of influencing the vote before, during and after election.
    2. The organized meetup, party, dining are not considered voting bribery in the circumstance of the cost per participant is below 200 USD.
    3. Small souvenir is allowed as the cost to each guest is below 20 USD.
    4. The penalty for a contravention of rule 1,2,3 is imposing a fine or deprivation of BP position for certain period of time, or both.
    5. EOS Election Commission (EEC) will be the organization monitoring the election procedure.
    6. The member of EEC can be replaced anytime if any member drops out due to personal reason or expelled by EOS Arbitrator.
    7. Anyone can file a petition to EOS Arbitrator if he/she finds that EEC member takes bribery. The petition charge is USD 300, which will be refunded by defendant if the defendant is found guilty.
    8. If any EEC member is found committing bribery behavior by EOS Arbitrator, EOS Arbitrator is empowered to expel the member out of EEC. A new member will replace.
    9. Anyone who is aware of a breach of rule 1,2,3 is encouraged to notify the EEC. The EEC will then determine whether it is appropriate to refer to the EOS Arbitrator for further investigation. The complainant should provide as much information as possible to enable assessment of the alleged breach. Evidence from which the EEC can make a formal assessment of its compliance with the rule should accompany complaints.
    10. If EOS Arbitrator accepts the case referred from EEC, the complainant shall pay the petition charge, USD 300 first, which will be refunded by defendant if the defendant is found guilty.
    11. EOS Arbitrator is empowered to, amongst other things, declare the BP who was elected not duly elected, the penalty fine amount, deprive the BP position, and to dismiss or uphold the petition in whole or in part.
    12. The penalty fine amount shall be used to compensate arbitrator work, and BLOCK.ONE shall set up an arbitration fund for arbitrator compensation and other cost related to arbitration.
    13. The decision from EOS Arbitrator is final.

    Regarding the Exchange Voting:
    1. Exchanges may vote for the tokens they own with a standalone account (not mixing with its users’ assets). 2. For its users’ token, exchange should design none manipulative interface for its users to choose among BP Candidates. Exchanges shall not create new manipulation of demography, disenfranchisement or misrecording, misuse of proxy.
    3. It is not allowed to use a preset framework contract/disclosure term to mislead users to delegate their voting rights to exchanges.

    (No anonymous voting is accepted.) -- further discuss

    If we can know exactly who is the voter, we can better fight the crimes. It is also in the financial world that the shareholder voting is open. In order to do this, a risk based KYC program could be implemented to make the crime cost higher and make the penalty easier. Privacy needs to be protected though.

    It is also in our view that the candidate should be more verified than the users, including KYC, source of funds, own EOS token holding, related party EOS holding.

    -EOSREAL
    A New World of EOS
    MP/VM: +1-949.468.5388

  • RomanCryptoLionsRomanCryptoLions Posts: 41 Jr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    ^^ We support this.

  • EOSREALGraceEOSREALGrace Posts: 15 Jr. Member - 1/5 EOS Tokens

    @mao said:
    No Manipulation in Voting

    No interference with the process of the voting, whether by increasing the vote share of the BP candidate, depressing the vote shares of the rival BP candidates, or both.

    No buying/selling votes in any forms.

    Discussion:

    In real-world political election system, there are many ways to manipulate the voting process. Although EOSIO prevents a lot of manipulations through technical solutions, one critical problem is vote buying.

    Vote buying can be in many forms such as monetary/token exchange, goods, services. Sometimes, it can be in more subtle forms such as a business partnership, job offering, certain benefits in kind…

    It is harmful to the whole system for any kind of vote buying because those who buy the votes spend more costs resulting to:
    1. Less financial resource to run the system as BP
    2. Take more out from the system to compensate the costs.

    Unlike in real world, In EOSIO, no one can be imprisoned. As a self-operated organization, the maximum penalty shall be deprived BP position in EOS community.

    First, we suggest to establish a EOS Election Commission (EEC) to monitor, analyze and investigate potential voting manipulations. Rather than kicking into the Arbitration process, voting commission can react to voting related disputes more cost-efficiently.

    We suggest the following fules:
    1. Anyone cannot ask for, receive or obtain, give or confer, any property or benefit with the intention of influencing the vote before, during and after election.
    2. The organized meetup, party, dining are not considered voting bribery in the circumstance of the cost per participant is below 200 USD.
    3. Small souvenir is allowed as the cost to each guest is below 20 USD.
    4. The penalty for a contravention of rule 1,2,3 is imposing a fine or deprivation of BP position for certain period of time, or both.
    5. EOS Election Commission (EEC) will be the organization monitoring the election procedure.
    6. The member of EEC can be replaced anytime if any member drops out due to personal reason or expelled by EOS Arbitrator.
    7. Anyone can file a petition to EOS Arbitrator if he/she finds that EEC member takes bribery. The petition charge is USD 300, which will be refunded by defendant if the defendant is found guilty.
    8. If any EEC member is found committing bribery behavior by EOS Arbitrator, EOS Arbitrator is empowered to expel the member out of EEC. A new member will replace.
    9. Anyone who is aware of a breach of rule 1,2,3 is encouraged to notify the EEC. The EEC will then determine whether it is appropriate to refer to the EOS Arbitrator for further investigation. The complainant should provide as much information as possible to enable assessment of the alleged breach. Evidence from which the EEC can make a formal assessment of its compliance with the rule should accompany complaints.
    10. If EOS Arbitrator accepts the case referred from EEC, the complainant shall pay the petition charge, USD 300 first, which will be refunded by defendant if the defendant is found guilty.
    11. EOS Arbitrator is empowered to, amongst other things, declare the BP who was elected not duly elected, the penalty fine amount, deprive the BP position, and to dismiss or uphold the petition in whole or in part.
    12. The penalty fine amount shall be used to compensate arbitrator work, and BLOCK.ONE shall set up an arbitration fund for arbitrator compensation and other cost related to arbitration.
    13. The decision from EOS Arbitrator is final.

    Regarding the Exchange Voting:
    1. Exchanges may vote for the tokens they own with a standalone account (not mixing with its users’ assets). 2. For its users’ token, exchange should design none manipulative interface for its users to choose among BP Candidates. Exchanges shall not create new manipulation of demography, disenfranchisement or misrecording, misuse of proxy.
    3. It is not allowed to use a preset framework contract/disclosure term to mislead users to delegate their voting rights to exchanges.

    (No anonymous voting is accepted.) -- further discuss

    If we can know exactly who is the voter, we can better fight the crimes. It is also in the financial world that the shareholder voting is open. In order to do this, a risk based KYC program could be implemented to make the crime cost higher and make the penalty easier. Privacy needs to be protected though.

    It is also in our view that the candidate should be more verified than the users, including KYC, source of funds, own EOS token holding, related party EOS holding.

    This is a very detail, very well thought piece from EOSREAL team, like to share with the community

  • exploringeosexploringeos Posts: 14 Brand New

    Thank you for putting this together @mao

    Generally I think it is way too specific for the constitution. Especially creating a bureaucracy from within the constitution I think goes way too far. I trust that arbitrators will work this out over time.

    1. If any EEC member is found committing bribery behavior by EOS Arbitrator, EOS Arbitrator is empowered to expel the member out of EEC. A new member will replace.

    If we did go with it, I think #8 would require that not only is the member expelled but is also fined heavily. Having a huge responsibility and power like that and taking a bribe should have greater consequences. Maybe joining the ECC requires you to stake and if you are expelled you forfeit your stake.

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